Introduction
The state as an entity that strives to strengthen its own security is a deeply entrenched conception in international relations studies. From a realist perspective, the state's security is closely related to the potential power it has to deter or outweigh the threats that naturally arise in the inherently anarchic arena of international Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review vol. 36 (2017) DOI: 10.1515 DOI: 10. /lfpr-2017 relations. The permanence of threats, mutual distrust between the states and the natural goal to survive (understood as physical security or guaranteed sovereignty) are the key poles of the realist theory and the security dilemmas it addresses. In the context of the realist theory of international relations, fear -as a response to perceived threats -is therefore unproblematic. There, the focus is on the response the state makes to a threat rather than on how it understands and experiences it (e.g., by feeling anxiety or fear). In this respect, the relationship between the state and threats to it is not a psychological phenomenon. The underlying reason behind this was the rationalization of the phenomenon of fear and the resulting neutralization of its psychological and irrational content. On the one hand, this enabled a clear and methodologically rather strict perspective on the analysis of international political processes; while on the other hand, however, it resulted in a standardization of the phenomenon of fear. This precedent of rationalization of fear might have been responsible for the lack of a substantive boundary between what it means for a state to experience fear on the one hand and threat on the other hand, in the canonical scholarship on neorealist international relations theories, as well as its lack of detailed analysis of different cases of fear in states and the variety of reasons for fear experienced therein. Finally, there is no analysis whatsoever on who (the state as an institution? its elites? the society? the individual?) feels/ experiences fear and how. This last issue very characteristically demonstrates the consequences of rationalization of fear: not only did one of the key driving forces in international relations become vague and obscure, but it also lacked a clear subject (who is afraid) and a definition of the experience of fear (what the feeling means and how it expresses itself ). It is therefore necessary to take a closer look into the issue of fear in international politics and to search for new theoretical frameworks that enable a more adequate analysis of the complex and multifarious phenomenon of the experience of fear.
One of the promising frameworks for analysis of fear is suggested by the emerging and increasingly popular traditions of understanding emotions in the processes of international politics. Despite a lack of widely agreed-upon principles in international politics research, scholars have noted that the factors that influence and often decide international politics are the experienced emotions rather than rational calculation on the part of states, which is theoretically significant. latter 'turn to emotions' enables a view of the state as an organism that has not only the visible, conscious, rational Ego, but also the deep, hardly rationally explicable level of collective subconscious, which − according to Carl Gustav Jung − subordinates and affects the choices of Ego, being as it is the most powerful fact of the human world 2 (Jung 1991). In other words, efforts to understand and explain the choices made by states with regard to, say, international politics, also necessitate the assessment of psychological state of the agent and the resulting consequences of its behaviour. This paper follows Jonathan Mercer's view that in explaining the behaviour of collective subjects, psychology should be seen as an ally, as opposed to an enemy, of rationality.
3 The rationale here is that absolute rationality (understood either economically as per Adam Smith or bureaucratically as per Max Weber) is practically impossible in the social sphere. 4 Emotions are a natural incentive for both the individual and the society. 5 In other words, the methodological choice to explain behaviour by ignoring emotions or seeing them merely from the theoretical perspective of rational behaviour is, conceptually speaking, a sub-optimal one. The markedly rational charge of the realist international relations theory and its key notions, on the other hand, makes it possible to see the analysis of emotions in foreign policy as a way of extending the explanatory scope of various incentives that lead states to behave in ways that they do. In other words, it repays to consider the non-rational nature of the phenomenon of fear and try and uncover the subconscious contents of fear as an emotion. This paper attempts to explain the emotion of fear by employing the notion of collective memory understood as a collection of imagery, symbols and building blocks of thought in the collective subconscious. Collective memory is not only a historical and political notion but also a psychological one. Emotions that we experience, as well as the reasons behind One might add that the claim that emotions affect the behaviour of societies does not warrant more scepticism than its opposite, namely the claim that this behaviour ought to be explained with reference to rational behaviour theories. them, are also closely linked to both the individual and the collective memory passed on to us. In order to understand the sources of fear (its reasons) and its expression (its experience), one therefore must take into account the function of collective memory.
In view of the discussion in this paper, the goal is to present a perspective of explaining fear as emotion, the arising and effects of which are indissociable from the contents of the nation's subconscious. Employing the model of collective memory analysis 6 by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, the paper proposes a framework for analysis of fear as an emotional arousal via the use of collective memory.
In light of the theoretical framework offered above, this paper analyzes the narrative of threat from Russia as construed by the Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who is constitutionally responsible for the formation of the country's foreign policy. Following the occupation of Crimea and the instantaneously increased military vulnerability of Lithuania, the country's official discourse has seen, it is argued, the formation of a highly emotionalized narrative of threat from Russia. The collective memory story lines that comprise this view, on the one hand, subsume the role of arguments that explain the threat, and on the other, indicate that there is a correlation between the understanding of the threat and the collective memory as a significant variable in ontological security. In other words, the (traumatic) narrative of the collective memory makes the threat from Russia a personal threat, making it into an emotion of fear. This is how the understanding of threat becomes not so much a practice of foreign policy (viz., there's a threat to be neutralized) but an identity-forming experience (viz., there's a threat to be experienced, to be consciously apprehended). We can thus see that emotions, as an interpretive lens, enable a new outlook on the processes of constructing the threat, the Other, and the I.
It should be noted that the paper does not aim for a comprehensive and nuanced analysis and assessment of the Lithuanian foreign policy discourse. Its focus is limited to an analysis of the content of President Grybauskaitė's public statements in Lithuanian and international media, during events commemorating nationally important dates, and in her annual addresses to the parliament (between the Crimean occupation of 2014 and spring of 2016). The criterion for content selection is the invoking of collective memory narratives used to name, explain, and assess the potential, the effect, and the possible negative consequences of the threat from Russia. Another group of important criteria comprise imagery and metaphors used for describing and explaining Russia and its threat to the country. Fear Without Rationality: Emotions in Lithuanian Foreign Policy
On the Concepts of Fear
For quite some time now, international relations have been paradigmatically understood as the interaction between rational and autonomous agents. Realists and neo-realists alike claim that states, which − according to them − are essentially consumers of security, always act in very similar ways -that is, they attempt to gain power and influence with the goal to survive. Kenneth Waltz's systemic theory holds that the number of units of power within the particular system is a key factor in any attempt to explain the state's foreign policy. According to him, the distribution and structure of power determine both the state's interests and the scope of their fulfilment.
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So the reasons for fear, according to Waltz, lie in the asymmetries of states' powers, and the reaction to this resulting asymmetry is always the balancing of power. This realist line of reasoning therefore predicts that both the fear felt by any state as well as its reaction to it would be either identical or at least very similar compared with any other state.
Paul Schroeder, however, disagrees with the neorealists' claims about the motives and incentives behind states' behaviour. According to him, the realist theory is grounded in the principle of sameness, rather than processual understanding. 8 Similarly, Ned Lebow notes that conventional international relations theories, grounded as they are in structural as opposed to processual explanations, are bound to fail to grasp the real causes behind social processes. 9 In this context of realist inclination towards generalisation, the notion of fear as it is felt by states is an issue that is both interesting and problematic.
The realist conception of international relations treats fear as a rational, rather than emotional practice of state's behaviour. In short, the reasons for fear are exterior (viz., in the international system) rather than interior to the state (viz., in its identity and psychology). The inability effectively to take responsibility for oneself leads to danger. The rational stimulus of fear, under the realist conception, will therefore make states avoid such situations as threats to their sovereignty. In other words, this line of thinking throws all instances of fear in different states into the same basket, failing to observe any significant differences between them. This happens because fear, for the realist, is neither a political nor a psychological phenomenon. As such, fear and danger are considered important only in so far as they point to the ways states react to them and to the events that caused them.
The notion of fear -as a socially constructed phenomenon -is suggested by the constructivists (as a process of the I-Other dichotomy) and some authors from the critical theory school of thought (e.g., David Campbell, who construes fear as a 'writing process'). This theoretical perspective excludes danger and risk in them, while noting, on the other hand, that anything can count as risk, depending on the way the danger is analysed and the way the given event is assessed. 10 Events or factors that we identify as danger become such only through our interpretation, and the process of interpretation is not necessarily grounded in objective factors.
However, both the constructivist and the liberal paradigms of international relations tend to underscore the dynamics of identity change as the key source of reasons for fear. Fear arises when the Other recedes from the I, and, following the liberalist line of thought, pays no heed to universal liberal values. In this respect, constructivists treat fear as a tool for affecting the audience (act of securitization) and to resolve national security problems (act of desecuritization). In other words, for constructivists, the fear of the Other plays a fairly rational and important function of both social construction (identity building) and social mobilisation (problem resolution). The liberalist notion of fear can also be described as a pragmatic one: fear arises when the rational and economically oriented principles of states' coexistence are violated.
All of this seems to suggest that the notion of fear, as it is employed in the conventional international relations research, has lost its emotional charge. In other words, despite the fact that emotions are usually regarded as irrational, the realist, constructivist and liberalist theories, by contrast, treat fear as a rational incentive.
The emotion of fear, I submit, expresses itself in the collectives of individuals as a phenomenon that is inexplicable within the confines of rationality. In other words, fear could be felt not because of the perceived asymmetry of power (pace realists) or a conscious effort to mobilise your peers against 'the receding Other'. The experience of fear could and should be understood as no less emotional a process as the love of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. Treating fear as emotion means that one considers its content to comprise non-conscious feelings that flood and animate the society, directing it towards behaviour that is not always rational. Of course, talking about non-consciously experienced emotions on the society level is somewhat unusual, and even more so in the context of international relations. The proposal to return emotions to the research on international processes faces pressure 
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from the worry that emotions generally might not be something that factors in politics, and especially international politics. It is often emphasised that emotions are the exclusive domain of psychology or even psychophysiology. It should be noted, however, that the last decade has seen a significant rise in both interest in and academic research on the role of emotions in international politics.
11 Having said that, a single agreed-upon definition of emotions has not yet been found in this field of social sciences, let alone a unified methodology for analysing emotions.
Scholars who analyse emotions in international relations follow the principle of treating emotions as an essentially cultural phenomenon. That is, emotions are regarded not so much as a psychophysiological occurrence within an individual, coming to the fore together with suckling mother's milk for the first time, but as a socio-political phenomenon that first appears in societal interaction. 12 An overview of a few dozens of influential scholarly works 13 on emotions in international relations suggests that emotions are emotional experiences of social subjects that arise in and receive their meaning from the context of a collective body. For example, Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker Emocijos, in their article 'Theorising Emotions in World Politics', conclude their analysis of different notions of emotions by saying that emotions are not a merely individual phenomenon: they also have a distinctive social charge, and thus require political theorising in addition to the psychological or the neurological one. Emotions do not fit the boundaries of physiology and psychology and may also be treated as a social and a normative phenomenon.
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A number of scholars working on the phenomenon of emotions note that the prototype of a rational, gain-maximizing agent fails to explain, or is in principle unfit to explain, many of the frequent precedents in international relations, such as conflicts, security dilemmas, or growth in moral panic or nationalism. So, according to these scholars, the twists and turns in international relations are suggestive of more than just a mechanical reaction to exogenous stimuli. Emotional climate and emotional relations are not just highly important in negotiations and resolution of international conflicts -they often play a fundamental role there. The kind of emotional climate that prevails while trying to categorise this or that political subject, for example, will largely decide the nature of relations between the subjects in question. In other words, emotions play a very significant role in collective knowledge and learning. Emotions affect the selection, understanding, and assessment of facts and events; at high levels of risk the subject or the collective body might selectively ignore certain pieces of information.
The domination of emotion and culture of fear in international relations can have a wide variety of consequences for foreign policy. First, an active emotion of fear will increase the transnational and inter-institutional distrust, which can eventually turn into inter-societal distrust. The feeling of fear can also become a source of other emotions felt by one society towards another, such as anger and hatred. Finally, the existence of emotion of fear in transnational relations will make the resolution of transnational or even larger-scale conflicts very hard to attain. This is directly supported by the hypotheses of the classic conflictology scholar Alfred Lewis Coser, who argued that the stronger the emotions of parties to the conflict are, the stronger the conflict itself will be, and the actual reasons behind the conflict will also be harder to both identify and resolve. 15 Another highly important aspect is the psychological understanding of the I and the Us. Emotional attachment, which cannot be explained with reference to a rational behaviour, is neatly captured by the notion of ontological security developed by Anthony Giddens. 16 Ontological security is essentially the view that the subject (the state) understands security not via exogenous factors but rather, primarily, as the preservation of the unity and consistence of its identity. Here the threat relates to the disruption of identity inertia (the unity of identity, its organic sense of values), and security connects with preservation of the routine state of affairs by stabilising the relationship between the I and the Other.
The routinizing of both oneself in adverse environment and of one's relationship with the other are emotional formulas or rituals that, once they've become part of everyday life, form a template for the subject's behaviour and thinking. From this perspective, explaining the behaviour via a rational, exogenous standpoint is ineffective. This is because the very principle of establishing the ontological security is based not on reflecting upon one's understanding of the action but rather on the goal of aligning the action with the logic of routine accepted by the given identity. Here, the effort to routinize the I and the I-Other interaction practices may lead to a conflict between physical security and ontological security. As Jennifer Mitzen notes, even a harmful or doomed state of affairs in international relations may indicate ontological security, which means that states are even more conflict-prone than is commonly supposed.
17 This can be seen as a victory of sorts for emotions over cold and rational thought.
The ontological security theory also helps delineate the notion of emotion of fear: this is a feeling of insecurity about oneself, of a loss of control over oneself and one's environment. It is essentially objectified anxiety (viz., one that arises from or because of a specific threat).
One can therefore conclude that the field of international relations permits a treatment of fear also as an emotion. However, providing an outline for a definition of fear as emotion necessitates a de-rationalization of fear. Within the context of conventional international relations theories discussed above, this would entail: (1) a separation of reasons/causes of the feeling of fear from the structure and dynamics of the international system; (2) a separation of reasons/causes of the feeling of fear from the identity asymmetry dynamics.
Reasons and sources of the emotion of fear
The key issues when talking about fear are its reasons and sources. In view of the theory of ontological security outlined above, we can define the emotion of fear as an objectified anxiety that arises due to disrupted identity routine. For the purposes of this paper, it is worth noting that this description is useful for analysing the meaning of collective memory in the construction of the discourses of fear. Collective memory is one of the key elements of identity. It performs a particular role in orienting oneself in historical time, and thus of continuity, of defining one's meaning in the geopolitical area, and of formation of expectations. Following Jörn Rüsen, we can say that collective memory is essentially a future-projection of the identity-based subject. 18 In other words, collective memory gives the coordinates for the process of being oneself and producing oneself in historical time. reason, collective memory is an especially sensitive part of a society as a living organism. Any threats to its unity are therefore liable to disrupt the routine that preserves ontological security.
One of the sources of emotions found in a society is collective memory. More precisely, the emotion of fear arises when something or someone threatens collective memory (by denying or attempting to change it), or when the imagery passively present in the collective memory of the nation is resurrected. The 'freed' and 'activated' fear in such processes essentially bears no direct links with power and identity asymmetry and has little to do with the calculation of objective external factors. The feeling of fear arises through the activation of imagery dormant in the collective sub-conscious, the imagery that is now being relived anew and employed in an effort to explain and understand current events. In other words, fear arises when (i) the boundaries between collective memory imagery and reality are being erased, and/or (ii) the collective memory narratives that preserve ontological security and the unity of identity are under siege. These two aspects are interrelated.
So collective memory, and especially the process of its (re)construction, has to do with the creation and re-awakening of emotions experienced by the society (e.g., fear, anger, resentment, love, etc.). The emotion of fear in the society could therefore express itself via the actualisation of the fear-inducing collective memory. Collective fear is generated, for example, through the escalation of the possibility of the repetition of past traumas, such as mass deportations, genocide, military occupation, war, natural disasters, etc. In other words, collective memories and contemplation of the threats and tragedies experienced in the past can lead to the feeling of fear at present. Essentially, this is a fear of loss of Oneself, born in the endogenous structure of identity as opposed to the exogenous structure of international order.
Agents of fear: activating the emotion of fear
It should be noted that society (as a mass of people) is far more complicated and intricate a unit than, say, an individual. One society does not directly partake in or interact with another society, nor does it directly touch upon (as a subject) the traumatic, emotion-inducing events. So the emotions that arise on the societal level cannot simultaneously arise in all citizens, when, say, there's a quarrel between two heads of states. This is to say that collective emotions arise and fade away in a far slower manner. Because society does not exist as a real, as opposed to abstract, body or entity, the responsibility for the arising of emotions lies in certain 'societal bodies'. Usually, these are politicians who are well aware of the role and the meaning of emotions in mobilising the masses. This paper proceeds by introducing a case of constructing the emotion of fear when the state encounters a threat. We should note at the outset that the methodological guidelines for analysing the emotion of fear do not aim for a comprehensive analysis of the creation of discourse of fear. As per above, the emotion of fear is an objectified feeling of ontological insecurity. The source and expression of fear are thus localised in a very wide spectrum of social practices and experiences. This is why particular politicians and institutions can control the systems of emotions in the society only to an extent. That is, they can be said to employ those systems of emotions rather than create them. So, the case of emotions generated by the mnemonic-emotive agents discussed below encompasses only a part of the process of the societal emotion formation and expression.
In light of the fact that the said 'societal bodies' play a role in the creation of emotions, it is useful to distinguish between the two stages of feeling the emotion on a societal level: (1) conscious rousing of the emotion; (2) non-conscious experience of the emotion.
The first stage is a kind of a prelude to the emotion. This prelude could be purposeful, but this stage is not yet that of a collective emotion. At this stage, the emotion has not yet come to 'fruition'. What we call a collective emotion is expressed in the second stage. Here, the society, just like a monolithic entity, undergoes the exact same feeling and experiences the same consequences of it. This feeling experienced at the societal level is non-conscious. Therefore, the expression of such a feeling on the societal level (e.g., fear, hatred, remorse, etc.) is essentially uncontrolled and not reflected upon. So, it is the emotion itself, experienced by the society, rather than its causes, that will be guiding its subsequent actions.
When it comes to forming emotions with regard to foreign policy, the key agents that construct and preserve them are political leaders (e.g., heads of states, government leaders, cabinet members, elected politicians, etc.) entrusted with decision-making powers. Political leaders are constantly in the public eye, and therefore enjoy the prerogative of forming the public opinion, beliefs, and emotions. Seeking political power and legitimisation, such agents often turn to and try to make use of history, that is, make collective memory of the society serve their own ends.
Whenever these agents touch upon collective memory, which itself forms an essential building block of the I, this is guaranteed to cause a stir in the public. Therefore, the golden age of the nation will be recollected with nostalgia (Austria is a case in point here), great military victories will be a source of pride and high self-esteem (the UK), mistakes of the past will cause shame and remorse (Germany), and lost battles -anger and humiliation (Russia). In other words, a brush with collective memory is never cold and dispassionate; any frustration with it (e.g., an attempt to question, rewrite, or even to deny collective memory) or transfer of traumatic memories to the present will cause an emotional response. For this reason, the agents who seek to employ the narratives of the past in order to mobilise the masses will also at the same time be the awakeners of emotions. Supplementing Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik's theoretical model of the politics of memory, 19 we can call these agents not just mnemonic agents, but rather mnemonic-emotive agents.
Utilising the politics of memory, mnemonic-emotive agents generate emotions with a view to strengthening or legitimising their current political standing. Emotions experienced on the societal level (if they are successfully transferred to the non-conscious experience discussed above) can therefore help these mnemonicemotive agents control and guide the masses.
Paradoxically, these attempts, on the part of mnemonic-emotive agents, to participate in governmental processes and to control public resources set certain constraints on the ways in which the collective memory and emotions can be constructed. Getting a good understanding of these constraints is crucial if we are to explain the reasons for and content of the fear society experiences.
Mnemonic-emotive agents, first and foremost, seek to appear reliable and significant to their audience(s), whose collective memory is to be constructed. Each audience, due to its unique historical, cultural, and institutional experience, will react differently towards suggested perspectives on collective memory and towards the emotions that are activated. To put it briefly, there is a certain gravitational pull of discursive meanings, which, on the one hand, sets certain constraints on power-seeking mnemonic-emotive agents with respect to acceptable interpretations and symbolic meanings; however, these constraints (and especially their denial or neglect) are crucial in the construction of negative emotions. To give an example, the limits of tolerance in Germany are such that under no circumstances should one question the fact of the Nazi crimes; while in the Baltic states, it is the fact of the USSR occupation that one should not tamper with. The activation of negative emotions has to do with a sort of an escape from the gravitational pull of this grand narrative of the nation. For instance, the negation of the fact of the USSR occupation in the Baltic states incites negative emotions (such as anger and fear), so the mnemonic-emotive agents who attempt to question this fact entrenched in the collective memory will be at high risk either of joining the ranks of ludicrous marginal figures or of being pronounced the enemy of the nation that is to be feared. A good example here is Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian politician who insisted that on 13 January 1990 'our own people were shooting at our own people'. At the same time, Russia's politics of questioning the fact of occupation and the crimes of USSR is becoming an important source of collective emotion of fear in Lithuania. So, for example, a neutral memory of Stalin, on the part of Russian students, and the fact that the association that comes to their minds is that of a nice moustache 20 rather than the repressions and terror suffered by Lithuania, will be a source not just of suspicion among Lithuanians, but also of fear.
Emotion of fear in Lithuanian foreign policy
I will now proceed with a further analysis as to why and how Lithuania's fear of Russia became an active and significant emotion in Lithuanian foreign policy. It should be noted at this point that the narrative of Russia as Lithuania's eternal enemy to national security dates back to Lithuania's declaration of independence.
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Part of Lithuania's right-wing political elite in particular would often promote, in public discourse, the idea of Russia as 'the empire of evil', 'a potential invader', or 'a geopolitical rival'. Nevertheless, such a narrative of a threat, based as it often was on historical grievances and emotional experiences, did not become the dominant view until as late as 2014. In both official and public discourse, this latter viewpoint had been counterbalanced by other perspectives that were oriented elsewhere than towards collective memory. These different viewpoints were commonly supplemented with the image of Russia as an 'economic partner', a 'geographical neighbour', which − to an extent − halted the maximisation and stereotyping of the fear of Russia. This is neatly illustrated by the fact that even after the GeorgiaRussia war, Lithuanian politicians sought to develop pragmatic Lithuania-Russia relations and even to 'reset' them. The programme of the 16th Government of Lithuania, for instance, underscored such a 'reset', as well as the need to focus on the future, not the past, in developing its relations with Russia. 
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Mnemonic-emotive agent in the construction of fear: Dalia Grybauskaitė
We now turn to the public statements of a mnemonic-emotive agent who played an extremely significant role in the formation of Lithuania's discourse of the threat from Russia. This is the President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who is now serving her second term in office. In 2009, President Grybauskaitė set out to reform the foreign policy propagated by her predecessor, President Valdas Adamkus, implying that it had been too declaratory and ceremonial. In her annual 2012 address to the parliament, Grybauskaitė stated the following: 'My priority lies not in ceremonial meetings or solemn declarations, but in constructive dialogue and value-based negotiations.'
23 She has always emphasised the need for a pragmatic approach. Grybauskaitė can be said to have performed the function of a mnemonic visionary -having turned away from the past, she was consolidating the political energy towards building a better future.
However, since Russia's occupation of Crimea, Grybauskaitė's foreign policy vision, which had underscored pragmatic values and the construction of politics by 'looking towards the future, not the past', has been undergoing a transformation. This transformation meant that not only did collective traumatic memories return to our foreign policy (specifically, to Lithuania-Russia relations), but also that the 'emotions' that were to be swept aside until then were now activated.
It is noteworthy that there are multiple reasons behind the shift of Lithuania's policy towards Russia. Russia's occupation of Crimea and the resulting violation of international law, its military involvement in Eastern Ukraine and Syria all led to a change in the geopolitical reality of the region. It is therefore only natural that security policies of Lithuania and other Baltic countries would also change. However, the geopolitical factors and Russian aggression in Ukraine do not by themselves account for the discursive practices that arose. In other words, the identification of a threat and the construction of the discourse of fear are not identical processes. The understanding of a threat can express itself in practice in different ways. The Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid, for example, who underscores the effectiveness of NATO's deterrence policy, sees no threat from Russia at all to the physical security of the Baltic States or of any other NATO member state. 24 And she is not the only highly-ranked official responsible for Estonia's foreign policy who shares this view. Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marina Kaljurand remarked, in the 23 See her annual address here: < https://www.lrp.lt/lt/pranesimas2016> 24 Estonian President Kaljulaid: 'I don't believe that Russia would attack a NATO country', 2017-18-05, <http://www.dw.com/en/estonian-president-kaljulaid-i-dont-believe-that-russia-would-attacka-nato-country/a-38889319>,2017-07-07.
context of the expansion of NATO's military presence in Estonia in 2015, that she sees no threat from Russia to Estonia's physical security, as the country is a member of both the EU and NATO. 25 The emphasis in this case lies on the strength of defensive capabilities in the face of a threat from Russia.
The rhetoric of President Grybauskaitė, on the other hand, contains no suggestion that Lithuania, also a member of the EU and NATO, sees no direct threat to its sovereignty, despite similarities with Estonia with respect to the geopolitical situation and military vulnerability. Grybauskaitė's public statements often allude to Russia's aggression, brutality, unpredictability, and its threat to the survival of Lithuania. Such a form of discourse seems to suggest that the country's reaction to the new threat has to do not only with changes in the neighbourhood, but also depends on internal factors such as Lithuania's political culture and foreign policy tradition, formation of the country's foreign policy identity, collective memory, the (psychological) personality of the leader(s), etc.
I proceed with a more detailed explanation of the formation of the Lithuanian discourse of threat from Russia within the framework of ontological security (or psychological comfort) as per above. The case at hand shows that certain story lines from the collective memory became guiding principles in the formation of the understanding of said threat.
Voicing her opinions on the events that followed the occupation of Crimea, the president often compares the direction of Russian foreign policy to those of Stalin and Hitler, and discussing the future trends of relations between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand and Russia and the West on the other, she invokes the ominous imagery of the Holocaust and the divisions of Europe. 26 In other words, the President employs historical imagery to induce fear and dread with regard to current affairs and their possible future trends. Associations of this sort are very common in her rhetoric. When she talks about Russia and the changing geopolitical reality, the President connects, either directly or indirectly, what is happening now to what was done by Stalin and Hitler. It must of course be admitted that such imagery had not been entirely absent from the Lithuanian discourse before, when talking about Russia and Putin. However, as I mentioned above, this sort of imagery had not been this active and was largely absent from the discourse on an official level.
Grybauskaitė used the imagery of collective memory not only as a means for 25
Formin: Estonia needs to ensure security although it doesn't see threat coming from Russia, 2015-12-07., <http://www.leta.lv/eng/defence_matters_eng/defence_matters_eng/news/A328DAEB-59DE-4790-A5D4-A6CFDB6F1AFB/ >,2017-07-07.
invoking fear, but also as a tool for intimidation/motivation. In the contexts of war, military occupations, and mass deportations, the President emphasised the imagery of vigour, invincibility, heroic resistance, and patriotism. For example, in her speech on the Day of Commemoration of Partisans (17 May 2014), the president said: 'Our love for our country had not been quenched by the crusaders, had not been taken away in cattle carriages, and nor will it be destroyed the propaganda of antagonistic forces, for we cannot live without Lithuania.' 27 In this way, the President seems to direct the energy created by fear towards strengthening both will and power to resist. On the other hand, the traumatic events of the past and symbols that represent them, such as 'cattle carriages' (which symbolise threat and trampling over the nation) and 'crusaders' (which symbolise both threat and the will and power of the nation to resist), are juxtaposed with Russian information operations of the present day. In other words, these symbols are meant to serve as signposts of the existential significance of present-day events, of the real intentions of the source of threat, and finally, of the actions to be taken and emotions to be felt by everyone observing the current course of Russian foreign policy.
The strength of all these associations is aided by the considerable attention paid to 'sketching' Putin's portrait. In Grybauskaitė's speeches, Putin personifies not only Stalin, Hitler, an imperialist, a villain, or a terrorist, she also underscores Putin's other characteristics that cause fear or at least anxiety, such as pathology and brutality. Grybauskaitė bluntly states that Putin is 'characterised by aggressiveness, violence, and a willingness to overstep boundaries' exactly to the extent of someone suffering from a psychiatric disorder. It is very important to note that in her speeches Grybauskaitė often neglects to draw a clear line between Putin and Russia. is left in the imagination of masses for a 'different' and 'better' Russia. In both past and present, or in the same way in present as in the past, Russia is to be seen at the epicentre of evil on the global scene. In other words, even though the form of Russia has been changing, its content for hundreds of years right up to the present has remained the same.
Emotional/identity shifts and transfers
Analysis of remarks by the President and other politicians and of the narratives active in the public sphere suggests that geopolitical reality is often explained via the contextualised shift towards the events of past. Such shifts play a crucial role in the construction of fear. It can therefore be said that the reasons for fear felt in Lithuania are not just geopolitical; they are at least just as much geo-emotional. So, the fact of the changed geopolitical reality has been swept away from the public and official discourse, giving way to an imagery of imperialism pursued by Russia, analogous with the Soviet and Tsarist expansionism. In other words, we can talk of discursive shifts towards the past, and see that the function of collective memory is not so much that of explaining the reality but that of experiencing it.
If we are to understand the content of fear that is deeply entrenched in Lithuania, this context is highly important. We should also appreciate its difference from collective memory imagery discussed above, which mainly served to help understand the character and goals of the object of threat. This emotional, identity shift puts us into contact with and lets us experience the threat. More precisely, it enables us to collectively experience it again.
So, the vast quantities of emotionally-charged messages in the Lithuanian press about the aggression exerted by Russia in a way transferred the country back, on the level of discourse, to the 1940 Soviet occupation, mass deportations, collectivization, etc. It is therefore easy to see why the Lithuanian discourse was dominated by the 'fact' of Russia's imminent attack. The emotional charge of public discourse was as if Lithuanians had already undergone the fact of Russia's military intervention.
For example, there were quite a few articles in one of Lithuania's most popular internet websites in 2014−16 that contain references, whether in the headlines or the content itself, to the idea that Russia intends to attack Lithuania and the Baltic states: 'Plan to divide "Pribaltika": Who was actually writing secret instructions', 39 39 'Planas, kaip padalinti "Pribaltiką": kas iš tiesų slapta rašė instrukcijas', 2017-03-21 <http:// www.delfi.lt/news/daily/demaskuok/planas-kaip-padalinti-pribaltika-kas-is-tiesu-slapta-raseinstrukcijas.d?id=74107364>,2017-07-07.
These identity shifts and transfers served to create a highly realistic system of beliefs. Once the boundaries are blurred between the past and the present, and between Lithuanian and Ukranian identities, the fear of aggression from Russia was a reaction to the real pain caused by it; it wasn't simply intimidation.
Finally, all of this is highly relevant if we are to understand why there was a persistent belief, in the public discourse, to the effect that in the event of Russia's military intervention NATO will probably not step in: in the collective imagination of Lithuanians, Russia had already attacked Lithuania. This served to intensify the sense of threat coming from the escalating situation, and made the feeling of fear very real and justified in the public imagination.
Conclusion
The notion of fear as an emotion and the principles for explaining the phenomenon of fear in foreign policy discourses of states presented in this paper should be treated as guidelines for further developing the analytic framework for understanding the entrenchment of fear in public and official discourses.
The analysis undertaken in this paper demonstrates that treating fear as an emotion enables an assessment of the aspects of the nation's psychology and its effect on foreign policy that have hitherto received relatively little attention in international relations research. It is shown that it repays to link the contents of phenomenon of fear, entrenched in the discourses, with collective memory. Due to their function of mobilising and orienting the society, collective memories (and traumatic memories in particular) are highly important in the processes of forming the society's identity and ensuring its regeneration. This is why the employment of sensitive (traumatic) memories, in defining and explaining threats, connects with ontological security. Therefore, the process of constructing the discourse of a threat is not limited, pace realists, to the object of the threat (in this case, Russia) or the international system, but rather depends on subjective identity routines (e.g., significant memories), which can become the guiding principles in understanding the threat. All of this suggests that the grasp of threat and the creation of discourses of threats have a clear psychological (or emotional) charge, that is, the threat is not only encountered by the subject but also subjectively experienced, that is, feel fear. Therefore, the understanding of threat also cannot be treated as a mere encounter of it.
The definition of mnemonic-emotive agent discussed in the paper suggests that memories and emotions can become a political tool in legitimising certain 55 Fear Without Rationality: Emotions in Lithuanian Foreign Policy political practices. We should note, however, that politicians lack complete control over collective memories and emotions. What they do is employ rather than singlehandedly create them. However, with regard to the methodology for analysis of fear proposed in this paper (which distinguishes two levels of emotion as it arises in the society, namely the conscious arousal of it and its nonconscious experience), one should not be led conclude that rational and consciously articulated actions are entirely of no importance. Those who arouse fear, that is, the mnemonicemotive agents, might be acting very rationally and tendentiously in giving rise to and strengthening fear. Nevertheless, according to the present author, attempts to identify the true nature of effect of emotion of fear should focus on the level of nonconscious experience of the emotion, the level which escapes complete control and manipulation of the consciously acting mnemonic-emotive agents.
Although the narrative of threat from Russia created by President Grybauskaitė cannot be fully identified with Lithuania's national narrative of the threat from Russia, it nevertheless shows how one of the most influential discourse managers represents the threat and creates the emotional context of fear. Narratives from the collective memory (especially the traumatic memories) are used as arguments to explain the level and scope of threat. This indicates that one of the prominent features of Lithuania's identity structure are traumatic experiences (occupation, deportations), which were activated in Lithuanian-Russian relations from 2014 and have since become an important narrative to explain the Russian policies. On the one hand, this goes some way towards explaining why the reaction by the Lithuanian president and other officials was highly sensitive. On the other, this shows that Lithuania's narrative of the threat from Russia should be assessed within the context of ontological security.
The assessment of threat based on the imagery from traumatic memories and the formation of discourse of fear is important for understanding the social dimension of Lithuania-Russia relations. For instance, the narrative to the effect that Russia seeks to attack Lithuania is based not so much on the logic of geopolitics but rather on the imagery of collective memory. This might be one of the reasons why Lithuania's official discourse largely lacks clear and consistent message that Lithuania, as a member of both the EU and NATO, is safe (from the point of view of military deterrence) and is not under threat (in the period at hand) of physical destruction. The country's discourse of Lithuania-Russia relations is therefore likely to continue to concentrate on collective memories that invoke narratives of the emotions of anger and revenge. In other words, the dynamics of said relations will be delineated by the emotive discourse that is introverted in character.
